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were present at the council meeting to testify as to what
occurred there and to give oral evidence as to what evidence
was presented at the council meeting. Counsel for the city
objected that the best evidence rule was thereby violated,
but the objection was overruled. If the record of the hearing before the council had been introduced, as it should have
been, the court would then have been in the same position
as if it had proceeded by certiorari.
While the law thus seems to be settled in this state that
local agencies may exercise adjudicating powers and that
their decisions are respected by courts if there is subst.antial
evidence to support them, it is anomalous that the Legislature is without power to put the decision of state boards
on the same footing. In Laisne v. California State Board 01
Optometry, 19 Cal. (2d) 831 [123 P. (2d) 457], a majority
of this court held that it would be an unconstitutional vesting of judicial power in a state board to give any degree
of finality to its decision of issues of fact in the revocation
of a professional license. In consequence, there must be a
complete judicial retrial of its fact decisions. The objections
to that doctrine are set forth at length in the dissenting
opinion in the Laisne case. The majority opinion there concluded that such constitutional judicial power could be vested
in local administrative bodies and that the exercise of such
power could be controlled, as to local boards, by the writ
of certiorari. (Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, supra, p. 847.) The inconsistency in characterizing the
revocation of a license by :1 state-wide board as ministerial
and reviewable by mandamus, while the same function when
performed by a local board would be judicial and reviewable by certiorari, has been pointed out in the Laisne dissent and elsewhere. (La,isne v. California State Board of
Optometry, supra, p. 869; see Elliott, Certiorari and the
Local Board [1941], 29 Cal. L. Rev. 586, 598; McGovney,
Court Review of Administrative Decisions [1942], 15 So. Cal.
L. Rcv. 391, 409; Turrentine, Restore Certiorari to Review the
Acts of State-Wide Administrative Bodies in California (1941],
29 Cal. L. Rev. 275; [1937] 25 Cal. L. Rev. 694, 704.)
If the writ of certiorari lies to review the revocation of
petitioner's license by the local board in the present case,
it would follow under the majority opinion in the Laisne
case that an exercise of constitutional judicial power is involved. Upon what ground, then, can it be held consistently
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that the writ of mandate is available f There is no refusal
to perform a ministerial duty or absence of an adequate remedy,as in Drummey v. State Boa;rd of Funeral Directors ~
Embalmers, 13 Cal. (2d) 75 [87 P. (2d) 848]. (See' Laisne
v. California. State Board of Optometry, supra; p.833~) The
only plausible· explanation for the extension of' mandate to
review the acts of local boards seems to' be the 'tille:tpressed
recognition that it is irrational to hold thata";pafticular
activity, the revocation of licenses, is nonjudicial.and reviewable 'exclusively by mandate when the revocatioll is by '8
state-wide board and still adhere to the older doctrine.,that
it is a judicial function and reviewable by certiorari exclu~
sively when the revocation ,is by a local agencY'·I: .~. .,.' .
If it were contended that the record of the city council's
hearing disclosed that it had before. it other eyidencesupporting its decision than that disclosed by the, testimony
in the trial court, there would be no alternative· but to remand the case to' the trial court, with instructions to' issue
a writ of certiorari. Since it appears,. however, that in the
tria:! court counsel for the, city did not contend that the
city council had before it any other evidence, it seems that
the result would have been the same had the case been tried
on certiorari. Consequently, it is unnecessary to dissent
from the judgment.
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 4425. In Bank. Sept. 29, 1942.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROY J. PUTNAM,
Appellant.
[1] . :::'ewdness-:-Preliminary Proccedings-Probable Oause.-Rcl1s-

onable or probable cause for the commitment· of a defendant
is established where at a preliminary hearing a twelve-yearold boy testifies that the defendant feIt his private parts,
where his mother corroborated the fact of his making a comMcK. Dig. References: [1] Lewdness, § 7; [2] Criminal Law,
§ 686; [3] Criminal Law, § 717; [4] Criminal Law, § 686; Lewdness,
§ 19; [5] Lewdness, § 21.
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plaint, and where another witness testifies to having seen the
defendant and the boy together on the day in question.
[2] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Cautionary Instructions-Minors.-Since as a general rule the testimony of
children admittedly competent as witnesses is not less trustworthy than the testimony of older persons, ordinarily there
is no occasion for a cautionary instruction on the basis of
their immaturity. Hence, in a prosecution for violation of
Pen. Code, § 288, in which the complaining witness is twelve
years old, it is proper to refuse to give an instruction that the
testimony of a ehild of immature years is to be viewed with
great care and caution.
[3] Id.-Instructions-Requests-Limitations on Rule.-It is in-.
cumbent upon a court in a criminal case to instruct the jury
on its own motion, charging them fully and fairly upon the
law relating to the facts; and it is not relieved of the duty to
give instructions whose necessity is developed through the
evidence. An instruction is necessary if it is vital to a proper
consideration of tae evidence by the jury.
[4] Id.-Province of Court and Jury-Cautionary Instructions-

Sex Cases: Lewdness-Instructions-Cautionary Instructions.
-In prosecutions for sex offenses, such as prosecutions for
violation of Pen. Code, § 288, it is the duty of the trial court
on its own motion to give a cautionary instruction to the effect
that the charge is easily made and difficult to disprove, for
which reason the testimony of the prosecuting witness should
be examined with caution.
[5] Lewdness-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions. - In a
prosecution for violation of Pun. Code, § 288, the failure of the
trial court on its own motion to instruct the jury to examine
the testimony of the prosecuting witness with caution was
reversible error where the witness testified that the defendant
patted his leg and on one occasion touched his privates, and
where his testimony at the trial ant! at the preliminary hearing was inconsistent as to whether on such occasion he was in
an automobile or defendant's room.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and· from an order denying a new trial.
Arthur Crum, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for violation of Pen. Code, § 288. Judgment of
convict.inn reversed.
[2] See 27 Cal. Jur. l81.
[3 J See 8 Cal. Jur, 309.
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Gladys Towles Root and Eugene V. McPherson for Appellant.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Appellant, convicted oiviolatirig section
288 of the Penal Code, appeals from the judgment· and froIl).
an order denying a motion for a new trial.
[1] Appellant contends at the outset that the trial court
erred in denying his motion, made under· section 995 of the.
Penal Code, to strike the information" on account . of the
insufficiency of the preliminary transcript."
At' the preliminary hearing the complaining witn~ss, a boy tw~tve years
old, testified as follows: He was playing in Westlake Park
in the city of Los Angeles on April 9, 1941, when appellant
offered him a job distributing handbills. He accepted the
job and the following day met appellant in the park at an
appointed time, and was told that appellant had to go home
to change his clothes and then had to go to the printer's to
get the bills because they weren't ready. The boy accompanied appellant in the latter's car to his lodgings a short
distance from the park. During the ride appellant placed his
hand on the boy's leg and in the words of the witness "on
the way over to the house . . .. he kept feeling my priyate
parts." When they arrived at a r()(jminghouSe they went
to the room of appellant, who 'proceeded to change his clothes
in the boy's presence, and asked if the witness wahted to see
his private parts. The boy said no, and did not see them.
Appellant also asked the boy if he knew what his own private
parts· were. While appellant was engaged in changing hiE
clothes, he again felt the boy's private parts. ,A few minutes
later they left the house and the complainmg witness· told .
appellant to "get a new boy, I'm through;" and' r8:n honie
and reported the incident to his mother. At the hearing
the boy's mother corroborated the complaint made by her son;
The manager of appellant's rooming house testified that she.
saw the complaining witness in the company of' appellant
at the rooming house on the day in question:, . The,foregoip.g;
testimony is sufficient tb establish that there'was'reasQnlible
or probable cause for appellant's cOn1mitment;'~ndthatthe
trial court did not abuse its discretio:ll m'denyingthe motion
to set aside the information, (In re McCarty,'~4d, Oaf :API),
473 [35 P. (2d) 568]; In re Mesquita, 139 Cal.' App. 91 (33
i
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P. (2d) 459]; Ex parte Heacock, 8 Cal. App. 420 [97
Pac. 77].)
Appellant contends that the order denying his motion was
based, not on the evidence presented at the hearing, but upon
a statement by the prosecuting officer that additional evidence would be presented at the trial. The argument on the
motion and the comments of the trial judge reveal that the
commitment was based upon the examination of the witnesses.
Although at one time during the hearing on the motion the
trial judge remarked, "I am frank to state that the showing
On the part of the People, in my opinion is very slight here, "
he later stated, in denying the motion, that he could not
ignore the statement of the complaining witness, "That he
kept feeling my private partS."
Appellant lays great emphasis upon the contention that
the trial court erred in refusing to give a cautionary instruction offered by appellant. Cautionary instructions in criminal prosecutions for sex offenses originated with the observation of Sir Matthew Hale that rape is ," an accusation easily
to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended
by the party accused, though never so innocent." (1 Pleas
of the Crown 634. See People v. Bens011" 6 Cal. 221 [65 Am.
Dec. 506] ; People v. Rogers, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 371 [79 P.
(2d) 404] ; Magwire. v. People, 7.7 Colo. 149 [235 Pac. 339] ;
Doyle v. State, 39 Fla. 1/55 [22 So. 272, 63 Am. St. Rep.
159] ; State v. Loomer, 105 Kan. 410 [184 Pac. 723] ; State
v. Lightheart, 153 Minn. 40 [189 N. W. 408]; Crump v.
Com., 98 Va. 833 [23 S.B. 760].) In a number of jurisdictions such instructions are regarded as an improper invasion of the province of the jury. (Doyle v. State, supra;
Black v. State, 119 Ga. 746 [47 S. E. 370] ; State v. Peterson,
102 Mont. 495 [59 P. (2d) 61]; State v. Birchard, 35 Ore.
484 [59:Pac. 468] ; State v. Rutledge, 63 Utah 546 [227 Pac.
. 479]; Crump v. Com., supra; see People v. Anthony, 185
Cal. 152 [196 Pac. 47] ; People v. Barnett, 99 Cal. App. 409
[278 Pac. 885]; People v. Hoosier, 24 Cal. App. 746 [142
Pac. 514].) In some jurisdictions their allowance or refusal
is wholly within the discretion of the trial court. (Magwire
v. People, supra; State v. Trusty, 122 Iowa 82 [97 N. W.
989] ; State v. Loomer, supra; Strand v. State, 36 Wyo. 78
[252 Pac. 1030] ; Territory v. Bodine, 32 Haw. 28. See, also,
People v. Barnett, supra; People v. Fraysier, 36 Cal. App.
579 [172 Pac. 1126] ; People v. Currie, 16 Cal. App. 731
[117 Pac. 941].) In still others failure to give such instruc.
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tions constitutes error and ground for reversal of judgments
of conviction.. (People v. Adams, 14 Cal. (2d) 154 [93 P.
(2d) 146] ; People v. Yaughan, 131 Cal. App. 265 [21 P. (2d)
438] ; People v. Garrett, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 249 [81 P. (2d)
. 241] ; Conners v.State, 47 Wis. 523[2 N. W. 1143] ; Rex v.
Parkin, 31 Manitoba 438.) Any uncertainty as to the right
of a defendant to such protection in this state was dispelled
by this court in People v. Lucas, 16 Cal. (2d) 178 [105 P.
(2d) 102, 130 A. L. R. 1485], stating: "We are firmly of
the view that in all cases' of this character.· the. defendant'
should be afforded the benefit of a cautionary instruction as
was here requested to the general effect that such 'a 'charge.
is easily made and difficult to disprove· for which reason the.
testimony of the prosecuting witness should be _examined
with caution." (Compare People v. Rangod, 112 Cal. 669
[44 Pac. 1071] ; People v. Knight, 63 Cal. App. 63 [218 Pac.
79]; People v. Hoosier, supra, which were deci~ed before
trial courts were authorized to comment on the .evidence.)
[2] The instruction that appellant requested was: "You
are hereby instructed to view with great care and caution the
testimony of a child of immature years." The court properly refused to give this instruction, for it would have failed
to instruct the jurors of the difficulty of defending against
the charges made. Although ordinarily the jury need not
be advised as .to the reasons for the rule of law in aninstruction, the facility with which charges of the kind here involved
may be invented places the defendant in a peculiarly vulnerable position, usually with no defense except his own denial
of the asserted misconduct. The defendant is entitled to
have the jurors informed that· the charges made' against_
him are "easily made and difficult to disprove" and that
"the testim<Jny of the prosecuting witness should be exam~
ined with caution." (People v. Lucas, supra.) A simple
admonition to view the testimony of the complaining witness
with caution would be inadequate and misleading, for it
would convey the impression that for undisclosed reasons the
trial judge distrusts the testimony of the particular witness.
(See People v. Rudolph, 28 Cal. App. 683 [153 Pac. 721] ;
People v. Kawasaki, 23 Cal. App. 92 [137 Pac .. 287].) The
cautionary instructions approved by the appellate courts
of this state as well as others in cases like the present one
have embodied the reasons that prompted them. (People v.
Adams, 14 Cal. (2d) 154 [93 P. (2d) 146]; People. 'v. Gar·
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rett, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 249 [81 P. (2d) 241J; People v.
Vaughtin,supra; People v. Hewitt, 78 CaL App. 426 [248
Pac,. 1021] ; People v. Fraysier, supra; People v. Currie, 16
Cal. App. 731 [117 Pac. 941].)
The particular instruction requested in this case, stressing
the witness's immaturity and seeking to have his testimony
viewed with caution for that reason alone, was rejected by
the trial court, probably because it did not' apply to the evidence and circumstances of the case. (People v. Maughs, 149
Cal. 253[86 Pac. 187] ; People v. Modina, 146 Cal. 142 [79
Pac. 842]. 'See, also, cases cited in 8 Cal. Jur., p. 32l.) There
is no general rule that the testimony of children admittedly
competent as witnesses is less trustworthy than the testimony
of older persons; hence there is ordinarily no occasion for a
cautionary instruction on that basis. (See cases cited in 27
Cal. Jur. 181.) In the present case the complaining witness
was twelve years old, well above the age of the incompetent
child witness envisaged in subdivision 2 of section 1880 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
[3] While the trial court did not err in refusing the particular instruction requested, it does not follow that it was
justified in failing to give an appropriate instruction. (See
People v. Frey, 165 Cal. 140 [131 Pac. 127] ; People v. Tapia,
131 Cal. 647 [63 Pac. 1001].) It is incumbent upon a court
in a criminal case to instruct the jury of its own motion,
charging them fully and fairly upon the law relating to the
facts of the case. (People v. Warren, 16 Cal. (2d) 103 [104
P. (2d) 1024]; People v. Scofield, 203 Cal. 703 [265 Pac.
914] ; People v. Nudo, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 381 [101 P. (2d)
162] ; People v. Curran, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 673 [75 P. (2d)
1090] ; People v. Best, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 606 [57 P. (2d)
168] ; see 8 Cal. Jur. 309.) The court is not relieved of the
duty to give instructions whose necessity is' "developed
through the evidence introduced at the trial." (People v.
Warren, supra.) An instruction is necessary if it is vital to
a proper consideration of the evidence by the jury. (People
v. Warren, sttpra; People v. Tapia, supra; People v. Heddens,
12 Cal. App. (2d) 245 [55 P. (2d) 230].) Accordingly, it has
been held that the court must of its own motion instruct the
jury in criminal cases with respect to accomplices and their
testimony (People v. Warren, supra; People v. Heddens,
supra), corroborative evidence in cases involving the obtain"
ing of property by false pretenses (People v. Curran, supra),
testimony of expert witnesses (People v. Williamson, 134 Cal.
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App. 775 [26 P. (2d) 681]), admission of confessions and
the necessity of independent proof of the corpus delicti (People v; Frey, supra (murder», definition of manslaughter in
prosecution for murder where evidence might sustain verdict
of manslaughter (People v. Manzo, 9 Cal. (2d) 594 [72 P.
(2d) 119]), and presumption of innocence and' burden of
proof (People v. Matthai, 135 Cal. 442 [67 Pac. 694] ; People
v. Soldavini, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 460 [114 P. (2d) 415].)
[4] A cautionary instruction in cases like the present one is
necessary to insure a proper consideration of the evidence by
the jury. It has long been recognized that there is no class
of prosecutions "attended with so much danger or which af~
ford so ample an opportunity for the free play of malice or
private vengeance." (People v. Benson, supra; see People v.
Lucas, supra; People v. Adams, supra; People v. Baldwin,
117 Cal. 244, 249 [49 Pac. 186] ; People v. Vaughan, supra.)
Thus in the Adams case this court observed that" As a matter
of practical observation to many judges who have presided
over trials of this nature, it is plainly recognized that, notwithstanding the salutary rule that an accused is presumed
to be innocent until his guilt has been established beyond a
reasonable doubt, nevertheless to the mind of the average
citizen or juror,' the mere fact that a person has been accused
of the commission of such an offense seems to constitute sufii~
cient evidence to warrant a verdict of 'guilty'; and that-'instead of its being necessary for the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-in order to secure an acquittal of the charge, it becomes incumbent upon the accused to
completely establish his innocence, and to accomplish that
result not only by a preponderance of the evidence but beyond
a reasonable doubt."
The requirement of cautionary instructions in cases like
the present one is prompted by the same considerations that
necessitate instructions with respect to corroborative evidence.
(See People v; Benson, supra; People v. Miller, 27 Oal. App.
(2d) 722 [81 P. (2d) 567] ; People v. Garrett, supra; People
v. Vaughan, S1lpra; People v. Caldwell, 55 Cal. App. 280 [203
Pac. 440].) No corroboration is required in cases like the presentone since it is ordinarily precluded by the very nature of
theoffense. (People v. Troutman, 187 Ca1. 313 [201Pac. 928];
Peoplev.Spillard,15 Cal. App. (2d) 649 [59 P.(2d) 887]i
People v. Von Benson, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 431 [101 P. (2d)
527].) The rule permitting a conviction on the uncorroborated
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testimony of the prosecuting witness is necessary to protect
the public but it needs a counterweight to protect the accused.
The policy that requires the court to instruct of its own motion
on the law relative to corroboration imposes a corresponding
duty to give cautionary instructions, for the very secrecy
that precludes corroboration also precludes effective denial.
The ordinary reaction to an accusation of a sex offense usually
committed' in secret is that the offense has been committed,
and a necessary safeguard against injustice is a warning to
view such accusations cautiously.
[5] The circumstances of the case must determine whether
the failure to instruct the jury constitutes ,prejudicial error.
(People v. Britton, 6 CaL (2d) 10 [56 P. (2d) 491].) In
People v. Garrett, supra, a judgment of conviction for violation of section 288 of the Penal Code, resting upon the uncorroborated testimony of. a ten-year-old child who apparently
had been coached before testifying was reversed for ref)lsal of
the trial court to give a cautionary instruction. (See, also,
Conners v; State, supra.) In People v. Lucas, supra, a failure
to give a cautionary instruction did not constitute reversible
error where an examination of the record disclosed that the
evidence clearly pointed to the appellant's guilt. It is apparent from the record in the present case, however" that the
failure to give a cautionary instruction was prejudicial and
that a different verdict would not have been improbable had
the error not occurred. The complaining witness, a twelveyear-old boy, testified that while he was riding in appellant's
automobile appellant placed his hand on the boy's leg. When
asked to show where, he placed his hand, according to the
court's description, "pretty close to the groin, I would say,
on the front of the leg though, right directly on the front of
the leg opposite the groin." The witness went on to testify
that during a drive of from five to ten minutes appellant
rubbed and patted his leg approximately nine or ten times;
that after arriving at appellant's rooming house appellant
changed his clothes in the boy's presence, meanwhile asking
the boy if he wanted to see appellant's private parts; and that
while at the rooming house appellant again' patted the witness' leg. The testimony disclosed that appellant did not at
any time top.ch the boy's bare skin or make any attempt to
unfasten his trousers. The witness, having testified that appellant "felt" or "touched" his private parts while they were
driving to appellant's rooming house, was interrogated by the
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court as follows:." Q. Did he ever take your private. parts in
his hand Y A. No, he did not. He felt them. Q. How did he
feel them? A. He ran his hand over. them. Q. How many
times Y A. Only the once." At the preliminary hearing the,
witness testified that while driving in the car appellant placed
his hand on the witness' leg only three or four times and
when asked if appellant then touched his private parts, answered that "he did in the house." Appellant denied the
charges. The jury was properly instructed that a witness is
presumed to speak the truth, but it was not cautioned as to.
the testimony of the prosecuting witness. In view of the circumscribed extent of the acts alleged and the. inconsistencies
in the witness' testimony, it is doubtful whether the same,
verdict would have been rendered had the cautionary instruction been given.
,
The judgment and the order denying the motion for new
trial are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Peters,
J. pro tem., concurred.
'
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